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NOTES
Patents on People and the U.S.
Constitution: Creating Slaves or
Enslaving Science?
[MJan"s power over Nature turns out to be a power exercised by some
men over other men with Nature as its instrument.
C. S. Lewis1
Introduction
Genetic engineering technologies have emerged from the laboratory
to meet the needs of the marketplace. Products of biotechnology hold
promise for increasing world food supplies, curing fatal viral infections,
producing pollution-free fuels, and curing lethal hereditary disorders.2
Not long ago the genes of bacteria were the subject of experiments; now
scientists are capable of manipulating genes of most multi-cellular
animals.
One contemplated use of such genetic engineering4 is splicing a gene
or several genes from one organism into another organism's DNA5 to
1. ABOLITION oF MAN 69 (1947).
2. More than 2000 human disorders have been found to result from mutations of a single
gene. V. McKusicK, MENDELIAN I-iER1TANCE IN MAN (7th ed. 1986). One such disease,
thalassemia, is caused by inadequate production of one of the two components of hemoglobin,
alpha and beta globin. Thalassemia claims the lives of 200,000 children annually. Human
Genetic Engineering: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the
House Committee on Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 232 (1982) [hereinafter
Human Genetic Engineering Hearings] (statement of Dr. Zsolt Harsanyi, VP E.F. Hutton &
Co., citing a report published in 298 Nature, at 416 (Nov. 16, 1982)). Children born with the
disease usually don't live longer than 20 years, despite blood transfusion treatments. Ia at
233.
3. Experiments in human gene transplants, however, have been delayed due to "un-
resolved questions." The proposed experiments would genetically alter human blood cells,
allowing scientists to assess the effectiveness of certain cancer treatments. N.Y. Times, Oct.
20, 1988, at All, col. I (national ed.).
4. "Genetic engineering" can be used to describe one or more techniques used either
alone or in combination. For the purposes of this note it will refer to recombinant DNA
technology only. For a description of recombinant DNA technology, see infra text accompa-
nying note 31.
5. DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) is the genetic material contained in living cells. The
cells of mammals contain dozens of chain-like molecules of DNA clustered together in chro-
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create a new life. form. 6 While currently employed in animals,7 in the
future this technology might be used to create new forms of human life.'
Like innovations in inanimate materials, genetically engineered life forms
are inventions.9 As genetic scientists develop new ways to refashion liv-
ing organisms, they will seek to shield the fruits of their research efforts
from competitors. United States patent laws will most likely be invoked
to provide such protection.
A genetic scientist might, for example, attempt to patent a geno-
type1" that will produce unique traits."1 Implanting a spliced DNA mol-
ecule containing genetic material from another source into an embryo's
mosomes. See Crick, The Genetic Code: III (October 1966), reprinted in SciENTIFic AMERI-
CAN, RECOMBINANT DNA (1978).
6. Insertion of human genetic material into fertilized mouse eggs has resulted in produc-
ing creatures that have never before existed. The offspring carry a hybrid gene, comprised of
human and mouse genetic components, that directs the production of TPA, a naturally occur-
ring protein in human blood. Female offspring with the hybrid gene produce TPA in their
milk and pass this trait on to future generations. Used in the treatment of heart attacks and
hemophilia, TPA is difficult and expensive to produce by more conventional methods. Genetic
engineering technology also may soon be used in sheep, cows, and goats to produce large
quantities of medically important proteins. Integrated Genetics Inc., Washington, D.C., Press
Release (Oct. 26, 1987).
7. See N.Y. Times, June 8, 1987, at Al, col. 3 (transgenic pig possessing gene spliced
from cow produces offspring that are leaner and grow faster); N.Y. Times, April 13, 1988, at
Al, col. 1. (United States Patent No. 4,736,866 issued for new breed of genetically altered mice
to be used in cancer research).
8. Dr. J.B.S. Haldane has suggested several possibilities for artificially altering human
genetic make-up in the future. One scenario involves grafting genetic material from other
species onto human cells. Animals possessing desirable characteristics, such as superior olfac-
tory capacities or loose skin that heals, with little scarring, might be used in hybridization.
Gene-grafting might make it possible to develop human astronauts equipped with prehensile
feet, no heels, and an ape-like pelvis suitable for life in the low gravity and cramped quarters of
a space ship. Human visitors to a high gravitational field such as that of Jupiter would fare
better if they were short-legged or quadrupedal. Haldane, Biological Possibilities for the
Human Species in the Next Ten Thousand Years, in MAN AND His FUTURE 337, 354-55 (G.
Wolstenholme ed. 1963); see Note, Asexual Reproduction and Genetic Engineering: A Consti-
tutional Assessment of the Technology of Cloning, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 476, 520 (1974).
Genetic manipulation of such magnitude and complexity in humans is beyond the scope
of both this note and the technical competence of the author. Any regulation of genetic engi-
neering technology, however, will influence which products and procedures will be derived
from the fields of genetics and biomedical engineering in the future. It is, therefore, critical
that such regulation be chosen carefully.
9. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
10. "Genotype" refers to an organism's specific genetic constitution or the composition of
one or a limited number of genes under investigation. W. KLUG & M. CUMMINGS, CONCEPTS
OF GENETICS 589 (1983). For the purpose of this note, genotype will be used to refer to the
product of a scientist's genetic intervention that is the subject of the patent application.
11. An embryo produced by genetic manipulation might meet the novelty requirement of
patentability under 35 U.S.C § 101 if the embryo possessed a unique genotype. See Diamond
v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1425 (PTO Bd. App. &
Int. 1987) aff'd, 846 F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
cells would produce an organism with traits that the scientist has chosen.
One day such recombinant DNA techniques may be used in human em-
bryos to treat genetic diseases by correcting defective genes, or even to
accentuate certain desirable characteristics such as height, intelligence,
or eye color. The prospect of obtaining patents for their inventions will
encourage scientists to pursue genetic research that may lead to cures for
illnesses that presently leave the afficted without much hope. But the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has attempted to
block the patenting of genetically engineered human genotypes and its
action could slow the pace of such medical advances.
On April 7, 1987, the PTO proclaimed that "[a] claim directed to or
including within its scope a human being will not be considered to be
patentable" because the grant of an exclusive property right in a human
being "is prohibited by the Constitution."12 Despite this proclamation,
the patentability of human inventions"a remains an unsettled question,
both because the PTO did not detail the grounds for its position and
because the PTO policy appears to rest on constitutional issues it lacks
the authority to resolve.
In exploring the constitutionality of patenting human genetic engi-
neering products, this Note examines three issues: first, whether granting
a person patent rights in genetic material implanted in another human
being infringes fundamental freedoms protected by the Constitution; sec-
ond, whether the patent holder's exercise of his patent rights violates the
constitutional rights of those who are born with patented genes contained
within their cells; and third, whether potential unconstitutional applica-
tions of patented human inventions would render such inventions
unpatentable.
Section I of this note examines the characteristics of a patent and
concludes that a scientist's property rights in his invention of a novel
12. The PTO's policy was published in a statement by Donald J. Quigg, Assistant Secre-
tary and Commissioner of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, April 7, 1987 [here-
inafter PTO Statement]. The relevant portions of the statement read as follows:
A claim directed to or including within its scope a human being will not be
considered to be patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101. The grant of a lim-
ited, but exclusive property right in a human being is prohibited by the Constitution.
Accordingly, it is suggested that any claim directed to a non-plant multicellular or-
ganism which would include a human being within its scope include the limitation
'non-human' to avoid this ground of rejection .... To the extent that the claimed
subject matter is directed to a non-human 'nonnaturally occurring manufacture or
composition of matter-a product of human ingenuity' (Diamond v. Chakrabarty
[447 U.S. 303 (1980)]), such claims will not be rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 as being
directed to nonstatutory subject matter.
13. A "human invention" is used here to mean an invention involving a human genotype
that meets the statutory patent requirements and expresses a distinct phenotype, that is-a
genetically determined characteristic or trait-whether discernible to observers or not. A
human invention may include claims to genetic manipulation in human embryos as well as in
persons already born. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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human genotype by themselves would not violate the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. Section II considers the constitutionality of an inventor's practice
of his patent."4 The discussion centers on how the manufacture of pat-
ented human genotypes might infringe basic constitutional protections of
the individuals possessing the patented genetic material. Section III as-
sesses how the availability of patented products of human genetic engi-
neering technology could lead to private discriminatory actions and state
actions mandating genetic alterations within the populace. Section IV
analyzes U.S. patent statutes to determine whether the possibility of un-
constitutional consequences of patenting human genotypes is a sufficient
ground to deny patents on such inventions. Finally, section V suggests
regulatory measures that could ameliorate the constitutional problems
presented by such patents.
Denying patents on inventions that involve human beings will shift
research efforts away from human genetic engineering technologies and
toward technologies that will lead to the development of products that
are protected under patent laws. On the other hand, allowing patented
inventions involving human beings to be manufactured may threaten
constitutional interests. While the PTO's policy reflects an antipathy for
new technologies whose implications may cut deeply against the grain of
our traditional values, it also presents profound and far-reaching conse-
quences for scientific progress and the future of biotechnology. Because
future biological inventions will require lawmakers to examine deep-
seated notions of the sanctity of life15 and the integrity of species, 6 the
administration of the patent system will determine how certain funda-
mental constitutional interests are to be balanced.
14. Practice of the patent refers to the manner in which the patentee has chosen to exer-
cise the statutory rights granted under the patent.
15. Patenting is the first step toward a "brave new world [where life may be reclassified
and reduced] to chemical programs." Patents and the Constitution: Transgenic Animals
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justic;
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1987) [herein-
after Patent Hearings] (testimony of Jeremy Rifkin, President, Foundation on Economic
Trends). "[U]se of genetic human traits in animals... [and t]he potential for patenting and
owning of animals with human traits brings up the ethical dilemma of the potential of the
creation of semihuman creatures which could be patented and sold." H.R. 1827, amend. no.
245, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., CONG. REc. S7269 (daily ed. May 28 1987) (statement by Sen.
Hatfield).
16. A. Hoyt, President of the Humane Society of the United States, has observed that
"patenting... would.., result in monopoly of genetic stock [and a] predominance of certain
genetic lines ... over others, with an ultimate loss of genetic diversity within a species,"
leading to "adverse social, ecological and economic consequences." Patent Hearings, supra
note 15, at 23.
I. Patent Rights and Human Subject Matter
Patent laws encourage scientists to develop new inventions 17 and
promote the growth of new industries."8 Patents are available only for
new and useful inventions that in some way expand society's accumu-
lated collective knowledge base. In exchange for public disclosure of the
invention, a patent grants an inventor a limited monopoly in her inven-
tion for seventeen years.' 9 Dissemination of technical information that
otherwise would remain secret stimulates innovation in fields related to
patented technologies, which in turn introduce new products and manu-
facturing processes.
A. Statutory Criteria For Patentable Inventions
Patents, governed by Title 35 of the United States Code,2' grant an
inventor exclusive rights to make, use, and sell the invention for seven-
teen years in exchange for public disclosure of how to make and use the
invention."' Full expression of Congress' intent to restrict patenting of
any invention is contained within Title 35 of the United States Code,2
which requires that subject matter otherwise patentable23 must also meet
requirements of novelty,24 usefulness, 25 and nonobviousness.26 In order
to receive a patent for an invention that meets these statutory criteria, the
applicant must particularly describe the elements of the invention for
which she seeks patent protection.27 The inventor must also disclose
how to make the invention.28 Because inventions involving biological
material often cannot be described in sufficient detail in writing, the in-
ventor must place the invention itself in a publicly accessible depository
17. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicon Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Universal Oil Co. v. Globe
Co., 322 U.S. 471 (1944).
18. The United States patent system is a dominant force influencing the commercializa-
don of new biotechnology products. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS (SUMMARY) 13 (1984).
19. 35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (West 1984).
20. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-272 (West 1984).
21. Id. § 154.
22. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12 (1966). All conditions of patentability are
contained within the code: "[An inventor] may obtain a patent [for an invention] subject to
the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 West 1984 (emphasis added).
23. Patentable subject matter includes a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.
35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1984). See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (living
material held to be patentable composition of matter).
24. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 102 (West 1984).
25. Id §§ 101, 112.
26. Id. § 103.
27. The description must be sufficiently "full, clear, concise and [in] exact terms" such
that "a person skilled in the relevant technology [can] make and use the invention." Id § 112.
28. "The specification... shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of
carrying out his invention." Id.
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for the entire term of the patent.29
Like inventions involving nonliving and nonhuman subject matter, a
human invention that meets the statutory criteria would be patentable
under current patent laws. Patentable human inventions might include
novel genotypes that code for, or express, useful and nonobvious pheno-
types.30 Such novel genotypes would be created by surgical procedures
performed on human embryos or existing individuals.
Recombinant DNA technology, or gene-splicing, involves obtaining
a strand of DNA from one organism and, isolating a precise fragment
containing desired genetic information. The fragment is then linked to a
second piece of DNA (from the same organism or a different one). Next,
the recombined molecules are returned to the nucleus cell from which
the DNA was initially removed. The inserted genetic material perma-
nently alters the organism's DNA. The trait produced in the organism
by the recombined DNA is reproduced in succeeding generations.3
Human inventions would likely employ prenatal 2 and postnatal ge-
netic therapy33 to correct existing genetic defects (genetic surgery), to
create certain genetic characteristics (e.g., hair color, height), or to alter
certain human traits (e.g., intelligence, personality). Human hybrids or
29. d § 114. See Feldman v. Aunstrup, 517 F.2d 1351, 186 U.S.P.Q. 108 (C.C.P.A.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 912 (1976); Exparte Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 168 U.S.P.Q. 99
(C.C.P.A. 1970); see also In re Lundak, 227 U.S.P.Q. 90 (1985). Yet, as patents on genetically
engineered animals are granted, deposit as a means of describing the invention will become
impractical. "[I]nventions relating to the development of animals having new and otherwise
patentable characteristics will rely on the identification and description of a known and readily
available animal that will be treated in a reproducible process to obtain the new animal variety.
The PrO is presently not aware of any organization that is willing and able to undertake the
responsibilities of a suitable depository for live animals." 52 Fed. Reg. 34081 (1987) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposed Sept. 9, 1987). Similar problems are sure to arise when
humans become the subject of patents. New methods of disclosure will have to be devised to
assist inventors of such products of human genetic engineering in complying with the statutory
criteria.
30. Phenotypes are the observable charactaristics or traits of a being that are genetically
controlled and determined by the genotype. W. KLUG & M. CUMMINGS, supra note 10, at 592.
31. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE, SPLICING LIFE: A REPORT ON THE SOCIAL
AND ETHICAL ISSUES OF GENETIC ENGINEERING WITH HUMAN BEINGS 46 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter SPLICING LIFE].
32. Prenatal gene therapy involves alteration or replacement of certain genes in every cell
of every tissue within an organism. Performing gene therapy on an embryo would involve
insertion of the desired gene into the mature ovum removed from a woman. The egg is then
fertilized in vitro, and implanted in the woman's uterus. This technique would be employed to
treat genetic diseases, such as cystic fibrosis, which affect many of the body's organs. Id. at 45-
46.
33. Post-natal genetic therapy is performed on a fully formed child or adult and involves
the alteration of genetic material within a single tissue. Tissue is removed from the patient,
desired genes are inserted in place of the patient's original genetic material, and the tissue is
then returned to the patient. Id. at 42-43.
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sub-humans might be created by splicing human genetic material with
that of a lower animal to produce an animal-human hybrid or altering
human DNA to produce certain "desired" disabilities (e.g., lower intelli-
gence, docile personality).
Myriad human inventions would be patentable. For example, a sci-
entist might seek patent protection for a genotype produced by cor-
recting a defective gene. In addition to eliminating the genetic disorder,
the resulting genotype also expresses a phenotype that leaves the individ-
ual with a heightened immunity to contagious diseases. In order to as-
sess whether the scientist's invention is patentable, the genotype would
have to meet the statutory requirements of novelty, usefulness, and
nonobviousness.
The genotype would be novel if the scientist were the first to con-
ceive of the genotype and to reduce it to practice.34 Reduction to prac-
tice involves either creating the genotype and implanting it in a human
being or describing in a patent application the arrangement of the newly
created DNA molecule. The scientist would likely become aware of the
benefits of the resulting phenotype through experiments in which the en-
gineered gene is implanted in a human subject.3" The novelty require-
ment would be met when the scientist first conceives of the new genotype
and implements the idea.36
To qualify for patent protection, the novel genotype would also have
to be both useful and nonobvious. A genotype that corrected a genetic
disorder would likely meet the usefulness requirement, but would not
necessarily be nonobvious. To satisfy this third criterion, the genotype
would have to represent a significant departure from all existing and nat-
34. At the time the scientist makes her discovery and within twelve months of filing her
patent application, the same genetic composition must not have been previously patented,
must have been unknown to others in the United States, and must not have been described in a
document published anywhere in the world. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 102(a), (b) (West 1984). In addi-
tion, the scientist must be the sole inventor of the genotype, must not have received a patent in
a foreign country prior to filing her patent application with the PTO, and must not have aban-
doned her invention. Id. §§ 102(c), (d), (f).
35. For discussions concerning genetic experiments on human beings, see Kass, Babies by
Means of in Vitro Fertilization: Unethical Experiments on the Unborn?, 285 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1174 (1971) (performing risk-filled experiments on the unborn presents the possibility of
producing genetic deformities); Note, State Prohibition of Fetal Experimentation and the Fun-
damental Right to Privacy, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1073 (1988) (arguing laws prohibiting fetal
experimentation unconstitutionally impinge on right to privacy in reproductive decisions of
couples and women).
36. Genetically engineered animal genotypes have been found to be sufficiently novel and
patentable. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). Therefore, new genetically engi-
neered human genotypes would also be sufficiently novel to meet the statutory criteria. The
scientist must, however, file her patent ipplication within one year of her first nonexperimental
creation of the genotype in a human subject. The patent statute bars the patenting of inven-
tions that are the subject of a "public use" or "sale" more than one year prior to the patent
application date on the grounds of lack of novelty. 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (West 1984).
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urally occurring human genotypes. Although correction of a genetic de-
fect that produced the same genotype possessed by all humans without
the disorder would not constitute such a departure, a genotype that
coded for a unique characteristic or significantly improved existing
human traits might. Thus a genotype that produced enhanced immunity
to disease would likely meet the nonobviousness requirement, and would
probably also meet the usefulness requirement.
Assuming the scientist is able to meet the disclosure and enablement
requirements by making a deposit of the genetic material sought to be
patented, the only remaining barrier to patent protection would be the
statutory subject matter requirement.37 In 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that living material created by humans through genetic interven-
tion is a composition of matter constituting patentable subject matter.3
The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences recently extended the
Court's ruling to include multicellular animals.39 Given the Supreme
Court's statement that statutory subject matter includes "anything under
the sun that is made by man,"'3" human inventions would seem to be
patentable subject matter. The PTO, however, has stated that "a human
being will not be considered to be patentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C. 101" because "[tjhe grant of a limited, but exclusive property
right in a human being is prohibited by the Constitution."41
Yet patented human inventions would cover altered genetic material
only, not the individual possessing the novel genotype. And the U.S.
Constitution does not prohibit patenting human genotypes. The PTO
does not refer in its policy statement to particular provisions in the Con-
stitution that prohibit such patents. Commentators suggest the PTO is
relying on the Thirteenth Amendment42 for constitutional foundation.4 3
37. See supra note 23.
38. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 477 U.S. 303 (1980) (single cell bacterium genetically al-
tered to create a new life form).
39. Exparte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (P.T.O. Bd. App. & Int. 1987) aff'd, 846 F.2d 77
(Fed. Cir. 1988), held that polyploid Pacific oysters are patentable subject matter. The patent
claim to the oysters, however, was denied on grounds of obviousness. Approximately 30 pat-
ent applications involving new animal life forms are presently pending before the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office. Telephone conversation with U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's Pub-
lie Affairs department, March 10, 1989.
40. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 303.
41. PTO Statement, supra note 12.
42. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST., amend. XIII. § 1.
43. LEGAL TIMES, June 15, 1987, at 16, col. 1. In addition, this writer suggests the PTO
may be looking to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It
would appear that an individual, possessing patented genetic material, would be entitled to the
constitutional protections that allowing patents on human inventions might infringe, but the
effect of the patented gene's phenotypic expression on a plaintiff's ability to successfully plead
a constitutional violation resulting from genetic therapy is beyond the scope of this Note.
Presumably, the PTO is equating an inventor's ownership rights in a pat-
ent with ownership of the patented article; additionally, the'PTO may
fear that those born with patented genes will be considered "manufac-
tured." The next section demonstrates that patenting human genotypes
will not result in the subjugation prohibited by the Thirteenth Amend-
ment's protections against slavery and involuntary servitude.
B. Property Rights in People?
A genetic scientist's ability to patent a novel manipulation of DNA
in a human genotype would seem to have little connection with General
Robert E. Lee's surrender at Appomattox. Yet the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, ratified six months after Appomattox, may control whether human
patents are constitutional. In addition to emancipating all persons held
in slavery in the United States, the Thirteenth Amendment provided
Congress broad enforcement powers.4 These powers were subsequently
exercised to give effect to the emancipation45 and prohibit subjugation of
one person by another.
Congress' power goes beyond protecting the rights of emancipated
slaves during the period of reconstruction and extends to eliminating pri-
vate and state actions that constitute "badges of slavery" or "relic[s] of
slavery.' ' 46 The Supreme Court has not only found a violation of the
Thirteenth Amendment in activities involving peonage,47 but has also
found badges of slavery in racial discrimination. In addition, courts
have invoked the Thirteenth Amendment to prohibit threats of legal con-
finement and acts short of forced labor.49
44. "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S.
CONST., AMEND. XIII, § 2; see Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (Congress has "power
to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the
United States.").
45. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883). The Framers of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment expected abolition to result in the enjoyment of the "oppressed slave [ofi his natural and
God-given rights" and in "the political and social elevation of negroes to all the rights of white
men." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2987-2990 (1864). See generally, Act of April 9,
1866, c. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, re-enacted by § 18 of the Enforcement Act of 1870; Act of May
31, 1870; c. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144, and codified in §§ 1977 and 1978 of the Revised
Statutes of 1874, now 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 (1964).
46. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
47. See, eg., Clyatt v. U.S. 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
48. Jones, 392 U.S. 409.
49. U.S. v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984) (in-
voluntary servitude includes psychological coercion involving one's subjugation of another's
will); see Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 873 (1945)
(intimidation of women into acts of prostitution prohibited by peonage statute); see also U.S. v.
Harris, 701 F.2d 1095, 1100 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1214 ("Threat of violence or
confinement, backed sufficiently by deeds" suffices to subjugate human beings to the will of
another in violation of the thirteenth amendment) (quoting U.S. v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562, 567
(4th Cir. 1981)); U.S. v. Tibbs, 564 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007
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Under the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress is empowered to se-
cure freedom, 0 which may be described as the absence of restrictions,
whether imposed by governments, by private individuals, or by environ-
mental conditions.5 In essence, a badge of slavery might be found in any
conduct that resulted in an absence of freedom.52
Impairment of one's freedom is caused by restraints on personal au-
tonomy, which may be separated into two related categories: internal
and external.53 Limits on either external or internal autonomy give rise
to social inferiority and will at some point amount to subjugation. The
Thirteenth Amendment clearly contemplates proscribing activities re-
sulting in subjugation.54
In the context of genetic engineering, subjugation would result when
the manufacture of a patented genotype creates inferiority in the result-
ing being. Subjugation of an individual with a manufactured genotype
may arise from what one author terms "genetic bondage": the imposi-
tion of badges of slavery by means of genetically engineering people ac-
cording to preconceived designs.55 Genetic bondage may involve
disabling conditions ranging from highly visible restrictions on external
autonomy (e.g., genetically engineering a person to be born of low intelli-
gence) to subtle intrusions upon internal autonomy (e.g., mass producing
the same genotype throughout the population, leading to an erosion of
the sense of individuality in one possessing the genotype).56 Regardless
(1978) (fear of physical harm such that the victim is afraid to leave required for finding of
involuntary servitude); United States v. Ingall, 73 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Cal. 1947) (retention of
services under threat of prosecution for adulterous relationship). But see United States v.
Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964) (conduct prohibited by involuntary servitude statute
limited to slavery and peonage, i.e., use or threat of physical punishment to enforce work and
use of state-imposed legal coercion to make debtor work for creditor. Threats to have em-
ployee deported held not to constitute involuntary servitude under 18 U.S.C. § 1584.).
50. Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. at 443; see Note, The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A
Preliminary Analysis, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1294, 1307 (1969).
51. Note, supra note 50, at 1307.
52. Badges of slavery include "restraints upon 'those fundamental rights which are the
essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey
property as is enjoyed by white citizens."' Jones, 392 U.S. at 441 (quoting Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 22 (1983)).
53. Internal autonomy is the individual's consciousness of himself or herself as a free
agent. External autonomy is the absence of societal control over the individual's conduct. See
Projects, The Computerization of Government Files: What Impact on the Individual? (Pt. IV),
15 UCLA L. Rnv. 1371, 1421-22 (1968); Note, supra note 8, at 515-16.
54. Restraints on internal autonomy include psychological subjugation of the type recog-
nized in United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d, 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984) (coercion of individual
into service by subjugation of individual's will). Restraints on external autonomy, including
use of physical force and physical confinement, result in subjugation and give rise to involun-
tary servitude. See United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v.
Harris, 701 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir. 1983).
55. See Note, supra note 8, at 517.
56. Id.
[Vol. 16:221
of the form of the subjugation, internal autonomy is impaired to the ex-
tent that the manufactured person does not have the capacity to feel
free.57 Moreover, an adverse impact on one's internal autonomy will
have a direct and proportionate impact on external autonomy.58
A patent on a human invention can be a badge of slavery if subjuga-
tion is the direct result of the patent.59 For example, the property rights
conveyed in a patent may give rise to constraints in the patented individ-
ual's external or internal autonomy.' In addition, compliance with stat-
utory requirements in filing for the patent61 or practicing the patent in a
particular way" may result in subjugation of the individual possessing
the patented genotype. Whether patenting a genetically engineered
human genotype constitutes subjugation and thus a badge of slavery may
be determined by looking to the nature of the property rights granted by
a patent.
The fundamental nature of an interest in property is a possessory
right to exclude others from use or enjoyment of the subject matter. 63
The scope of the property interest may be measured by how rights in the
property can be enforced. Property law has long distinguished rights in
tangible personal property over which possession may be taken ("choses
in possession") from rights in intangible property that can be enforced by
action, but not by physical possession ("choses in action")."4
A patent represents a personal property65 right in an intangible
thing.66 Patent rights are a "species" of property67 akin to "choses in
57. Id at 518.
58. Ia
59. See United States v. Harris: "mT1he statute [enacted to enforce the Thirteenth Amend-
ment's prohibition of involuntary servitude] must be read not only to render criminal the evil
that Congress sought to eradicate so long ago but as well its Twentieth Century counterpart."
701 F.2d 1095, 1100 (4th Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562, 566-67
(4th Cir. 1981)). Presumably, the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibitions would also apply to
slavery and involuntary servitude's twenty-first century counterparts.
60. See infra notes 83-84.
61. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 75-82, 86-89 and accompanying text.
63. See generally, R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1975).
64. Id
65. 35 U.S.C.A. § 261 (West 1984).
66. McClaskey v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., 46 F. Supp. 937, 938 (1942) (patent
rights cannot be seized and levied, but may be subject to an in personam judgment); cf. Ste-
phens v. Cady, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 528 (1852) (sale of a copperplate engraving of a map from a
court's execution against the owner of the copyright did not transfer to the purchaser rights to
strike off and sell copies of the map. "The copperplate engraving, like any other tangible
personal property, is subject of seizure and sale, on execution, and the title passes to the pur-
chaser, the same as if made at a private sale. But the incorporeal right, secured by the statute
to the author, to multiply copies of the map, by use of the plate, being intangible, and resting
altogether in grant, is not the subject of seizure or sale by means of this proess .... ." Id. at
531); cf. Stevens v. Gladding, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 447, 452 (1854) (a copyright in a map and
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action."'68 Property rights granted under a patent are limited to those
rights prescribed by Congress.6 9 The patentee may recover damages
from infringers of the patent.70 And although the patentee may manu-
facture, use, or sell the patented product, or assign or license others to do
so,v 1 patents do not confer possessory rights in the article in which the
inventor has patent rights.
Therefore, a holder of a patent in a human invention does not have
rights in the physical manifestation of the patented genotype, in the trait
expressed by the genetic manipulation, nor in any unaltered genotypes
possessed by the recipient of the patented gene. An inventor holding a
patent on a new form of human genotype would have an exclusive right
only to practice the patent-that is, to make, use, or sell the patented
genotype himself. The inventor would have the right only to enforce
actions to exclude others from manufacturing, using, or selling the pat-
ented genotype.72 Once the patented genotype is sold and implanted, the
patentee impliedly licenses the recipient to use the product.
73
The intangible right in a human genotype represented by a patent
would not by itself impinge upon the internal or external autonomy of
the person possessing that genotype. The patent holder's exercise of his
right to exclude others from manufacturing, using or selling the human
invention would not by itself give rise to socially imposed inferiority in
patients of genetic therapy. Nor would his right to enforce actions re-
lated to the patent result in subjugation of the individual possessing that
genotype manufactured under the patent. Therefore, the patent holder's
rights in an invention involving a human being do not of themselves con-
stitute badges of slavery.
II. Unconstitutional Uses of Patented Human Inventions
Although mere ownership of patent rights in a novel human geno-
type would not infringe the basic constitutional freedoms of those pos-
sessing the patented gene, problems might be presented by the manner in
ownership of the plate used to print and publish the map "are distinct subjects of property,
each capable of existing and being owned and transferred, independent of the other.").
67. See Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856); 2 LIPSCOMB'S WALKER ON
PATENTS § 8:13 (3d ed. 1985).
68. R. BROWN, supra note 63, at 11.
69. Crown Die and Tool Co. v. Nye Tool and Machine Works, 261 U.S. 24 (1923); Gayler
v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 477 (1850). See generally 4 DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS, § 332, 334-37
(2d ed. 1965).
70. 35 U.S.C.A. § 284 (West 1984). When a patent has been infringed, the court may
award a reasonable royalty in addition to interest and costs. In its discretion, the court also
may award treble damages. Id.
71. Id. § 261.
72. See id. § 154.
73. See United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
which a patent holder decided to practice her patent. Certain practices
of the patent might intrude upon fundamental rights guaranteed either
explicitly or implicitly in the Constitution. The explicit constitutional
right relevant to this discussion is the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibi-
tion of subjugation giving rise to badges of slavery. Genetic engineering
procedures also threaten implicit guarantees such as the right to privacy
and the right to procreate.
A. Intrusion Upon Explicit Constitutional Guarantees
Subjugation of a human being might ultimately arise from an inven-
tor's practice of her patent. Genetic intervention that resulted in re-
straints on a person's autonomy might constitute a badge of slavery74 and
consequently a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. Acts of subjuga-
tion arising from an inventor's practice of her patent, however, are not
the same as mere ownership of a patent in a novel genotype. The PTO's
prohibition on patenting human subject matter might be directed at
preventing unconstitutional uses of patented human inventions.
1. Patent Practice and the Origin of a New Species
Although subjugation would not result from granting patents for
human inventions, exercising patent rights to manufacture human-
animal hybrids or sub-human beings who were disabled by genetic ma-
nipulation would constitute subjugation through genetic bondage.7"
Through the patent holder or licensee's "control and planning [of a per-
son's] potentiality... in a way that would leave the 'manufactured' per-
son unsuitable for most... lifestyles and environments," 76 practicing the
patent could give rise to badges of slavery. Those disabled by genetic
intervention would suffer severe restraints on their external autonomy.
The resulting social inferiority of these beings would be a form of subju-
gation, so that their mere existence would constitute a form of slavery.77
Even a being manufactured with exceptional capacities could experi-
ence restraints upon external autonomy. These special capacities could
give rise to a lifestyle predetermined by the being's creators.7" The in-
ability to choose the course of one's own life due to genetically engi-
neered superior or inferior traits would deny to the affected being a
fundamental freedom.
74. See supra note 52.
75. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
76. Note, supra note 8, at 520.
77. See D. RORVIK, BRAvE NEW BABY 102 (1971) (citing panel of scientists predicting
use of parahumans to perform undesirable tasks).
78. Note, supra note 8, at 521. See A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932) (science
fiction depicting a world where societal roles are predetermined according to intellectual ca-
pacities produced by cloning).
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Restraints on an individual's internal autonomy 79 may lead to more
subtle forms of subjugation. For instance, the Sixth Circuit recently
found involuntary servitude imposed by activities coming close to psy-
chological programming.8 0 If a thirteenth amendment violation may be
found in mental coercion, it is probable that more direct control over
another's thoughts and decisions imposed through genetic manipulation
would certainly impinge upon that person's capacity for independent
thought and action." Therefore, programming a person's wants, values,
and personality through genetic intervention would seem to violate the
Thirteenth Amendment. 2
2. Shackles Imposed by Genetic Intervention
One's perception that he is controlled by genetic forces programmed
before birth may narrow the range of opportunities of which he will avail
himself. Regardless of whether the restraints are real or fictitious, the
belief that restraints exist may constrain internal autonomy to the point
of subjugation.
An individual's knowledge that he possesses a patented genotype
may create a perception that he is "less human" than non-patented indi-
viduals. If the trait is one that is commonly available in the marketplace,
the individual may see himself as an article of manufacture and hence
inferior to other members of society. 3 If one's basic nature, one's genetic
identity, becomes subject to external manipulation, one's ability to con-
ceive of oneself as a free and rational being may weaken and ultimately
disappear.84 Such restraints on internal autonomy could give rise to un-
constitutional subjugation.
Use of gene therapy to correct blood and enzyme disorders, how-
ever, is unlikely to adversely affect internal autonomy. Corrective ge-
79. See supra note 53.
80. United States v. King, 840 F.2d 1276 (6th Cir. 1988).
81. See Fried, Introduction: The Need for a Philosophical Anthropology, 48 IND. L.J. 5-27
(1973). Involuntary servitude has been found in the specific intent to subjugate the will of
others so as to "render them incapable of choosing a course other than that ordered by [their
master]." United States v. King, 840 F.2d 1276 (6th Cir. 1988) (leaders of communal cult
found guilty of conspiring to hold children in involuntary servitude).
82. The King court recognized that agreements analogous to master/apprentice arrange-
ments might be exempt from the Thirteenth Amendment. A contract between a parent and a
genetic surgeon to implant a certain patented genotype in a fetus might represent an analogous
permissible contract. Courts, however, generally review contracts concerning children to en-
sure they are in the child's best interest. Id. at 1283 (citing Knight v. Deavers, 259 Ark. 45,
531 S.W.2d 252 (1976)).
83. The "basis for any given legal order would be swept away by the manipulation and
manufacture of human beings according to certain predetermined standards." Friedman, In-
terference with Human Life: Some Jurisprudential Reflections, 70 COLUM. L. Rav. 1058,- 1077
(1970).
84. Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumen-
tal Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. Rav. 617, 648 (1974).
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netic therapy contemplates use of a patented genotypeas an antidote to a
life-threatening condition. One possessing the patented gene would feel
no less human in relation to others than would one possessing an artifi-
cial limb or a transplanted organ. Therefore, use of patented inventions
in genetic surgery will not impermissibly constrain a patient's internal
autonomy to the point of subjugation. Genetic manipulation for en-
hancement or eugenic8 5 purposes, on the other hand, may produce ine-
quality and lead to incursions on internal autonomy. .
Wholesale manufacture and sale of the same patented genetic coding
for one or several traits implanted in human beings would lessen dissimi-
larities among people for certain characteristics. Although paradoxical,
such genetically imposed uniformity could create inequality. It has been
argued, for example, that the right to an individual identity86 is a deeply
cherished aspect of freedom. Since innumerable possible combinations of
genotypes exist, it is highly unlikely that two unrelated people would
inherit identical genetic constitutions. In this context, the proclamation
of the Declaration of Independence that "all men are created equal" can
be interpreted as creating an equal opportunity to acquire a unique or
previously undetermined genotype.8 7
Imposition of a predetermined genotype upon another is also likely
to cause a diminution in external autonomy.88 For example, if patented
genotypes allow parents to choose characteristics for their children, the
children may have little sense of themselves as individuals, particularly if
some genetic selections are more popular than others. Conversely, those
who do not inherit societally favored characteristics may be stigmatized
as outcasts.
The effect on an individual's internal and external autonomy of
manufacturing human genotypes would vary according to the particular
manufacturing practice employed. Mass production of patented ge-
notypes is likely to pose more of a threat to individuality and to internal
and external autonomy than selective genetic manipulation. Likewise,
the impact on internal autonomy from phenotypic enhancement or
eugenics policies will be more significant than that caused by corrective
85. Eugenics refers to state sponsored programs attempting to influence the genetic com-
position of the population. Eugenics policies may either be "positive" or "negative." "Positive
eugenics" connotes a state goal to improve the community gene pool by increasing the propor-
tion of offspring with selected genetic traits. "Negative eugenics" policies seek to reduce the
occurrence of harmful phenotypes by eliminating genotypes that code for the disorder. See
Vukowich, The Dawning of the Brave New World-Legal, Ethical and Social Issues of Eugen-
ics, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 189, 194. See Note, supra note 8, at 563. A state's negative eugenics
policy might be implemented by requiring that patented genetic material which corrects a
genetic defect be substituted for the defective genes in persons suffering from various inherited
disorders. See Note, supra note 8, at 563.
86. See Note, supra note 8, at 507 (right to unique genotype to justify ban-on cloning).
87. Id at 507-08.
88. Id at 518.
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genetic surgery. Although protecting these interests may not justify ban-
ning all patenting of human inventions, it is sufficient to warrant the reg-
ulation of the manufacturing of human genotypes. 9
3. Patent Disclosure
Public disclosure in a patent of a person's genetic information might
well constitute a badge of slavery because those having knowledge of the
phenotype expressed by patented genetic material conceivably could an-
ticipate how one possessing the phenotype would react to certain stim-
uli. 90 The ability to predict and control responses through the selection
of stimuli would limit the person's external and internal autonomy. The
individual would be subjugated to those who had the ability to influence
his behavior.
This analysis assumes that a particular gene's phenotypic expression
can be ascertained with great accuracy from knowledge of the corre-
sponding genotype and that specific traits give rise to highly predictable
patterns of behavior. A person's phenotype, however, is not determined
solely by the genetic material contained within his DNA. Environmental
factors help shape the development of traits.91 For example, suppose a
certain genotype is created that produces a specialized predisposition to
aggression in a person. Those with access to the information contained
in the patent might be able to induce aggressive behavior in individuals
possessing the patented genotype. The individual's behavior, however,
could also be influenced by environmental factors, such as risk of danger
or memories of previous encounters with police.
Because the link between behavior and DNA is anything but cer-
tain, it is unlikely that disclosure in a patent of genetic components
would lead to control and subjugation of those who received patented
89. The manner in which such regulation may be effected is discussed infra. See infra pp.
252-257.
90. Cf Note, supra note 8, at 516.
91. Because a person's behavior is influenced by environment as well as by genetic
makeup, the predictability of behavior based on genetic factors would be uncertain. See
Human Genetic Engineering Hearings, supra note 2, at 468 (statement of Bernard D. Davis,
Professor of Bacterial Physiology, Harvard University Medical School, concerning environ-
mental and genetic influences on behavior). A controversy currently rages over which force-
genetics or environment-exerts the greater influence on human behavior. See D. WooD-
WARD & J. WOODWARD, CONCEPTS OF MOLECULAR GENETICS 396 (1977). Klug and Cum-
mings have observed, "The prevailing view is that all behavior patterns are influenced both
genetically and environmentally. The genotype provides the physical and/or mental ability
essential to execute the behavior and further determines the limitations of environmental influ-
ences." W. KLUG & M. CUMMINGS, supra note 10, at 489. See generally, D. THIESSEN, THE
GENETIC ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR (1967). For an interesting examination of the writings of
sciefitists who were active in this "nature-nurture" debate, see N. PASTORE, THE NATURE-
NURTURE CONTROVERSY (1949) (identifying a causal relationship between sociopolitical ori-
entation and scientific position on the nature-nurture issue).
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genetic implants. If the patented gene's phenotypic expression for cer-
tain behavior cannot be predicted with confidence from information con-
tained in the patent, then disclosure of patented genetic coding would not
threaten external or internal autonomy and the patent statute's disclo-
sure requirement could not impose a badge of slavery upon those possess-
ing patented genotypes.
Clearly, implanting patented genes that would have the effect of en-
slaving individuals by "genetic bondage" would be unconstitutional. Ge-
netic manipulation giving rise to the creation of sub-humans or' human-
animal hybrids impose obvious restrictions on external autonomy.92 The
constitutionality of incursions on internal autonomy, however, is less cer-
tain. As opposed to restraints upon external autonomy, which are im-
posed by outsiders, restraints on internal autonomy are a product of the
subjective perception of one's own freedom. As genetic manipulation in
humans becomes commonplace, patients of genetic surgery may no
longer perceive themselves to be less human or less free than individuals
who have not received patented genetic implants. Therefore, mild re-
straints on another's internal autonomy, such as disclosure of a genotype
in a patent, or performing prenatal genetic surgery to implant a patented
genotype, may well fall within the sphere of constitutionally permissible
activity.
Permissible practices of a patent involving a human invention
should be defined by the boundaries of autonomy that an individual pos-
sessing a patented genotype experiences. Although human inventions
may be constitutionally the subject matter of a patent, the Constitution
may narrowly confine the scope of permissible patent practices. The
range of permissible practices, however, may expand as social acceptance
of genetic intervention grows, influenced by the benefits that such inven-
tions will bring to society.
B. Practicing a Patent and its Effect on Implicit Constitutional Rights.
In addition to violations of the Thirteenth Amendment, the PTO
may be anticipating other unconstitutional consequences of an inventor's
practice of his patent. Certain fundamental rights not contained within
the text of the Constitution have been found to be so basic to the Consti-
tution's explicit scheme of civil liberties that these rights are afforded
constitutional protection.93 Patent statutes may infringe fundamental
rights of those possessing genotypes manufactured under a patent in at
92. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
93. Identifying where in the Constitution implicit rights reside is not always easy. See
Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH., L. Rnv. 981, 983-84
(1979): "Often, members of the Court agree upon the preferred status of an interest but disa-
gree about its textual source. On occasion, members of the Court concede that an interest has
no textual source, yet battle still over which strand of the fourteenth amendment protects it
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least two ways. First, as a result of sexual reproduction, a person with a
patented genotype may be subject to liability for infringing the patent.
Second, one's privacy interest in keeping highly personal information
confidential may be infringed by a patent's disclosure of one's genetic
constitution.
1. Patent Infringement Through Sexual Reproduction of the Genotype
Liability for patent infringement exists regardless of intent on the
part of the infringer9" and even if the invention is recreated by a process
other than the method employed by the inventor and disclosed in the
patent.95 Thus, a person having a patented genotype might be open to
attack for infringing the patent if she were to reproduce the invention
without license from the inventor.
Arguably, under the "doctrine of equivalents," 96 sexual reproduc-
tion of a patented genotype would constitute patent infringement of the
patent if the protected genetic coding were inherited by the offspring.97
Consequently, people receiving patented DNA through prenatal genetic
surgery would face the threat of liability upon reproduction of the pat-
ented genotype.98 If the purpose of the invention were to correct a life-
threatening disorder, the decision to procreate would involve harsh con-
sequences: if the corrected genotype were not inherited, birth could re-
sult in a crippling disease; if the patented genotype were inherited, there
would be a risk of suit by the inventor. Thus, patent laws might have a
chilling effect on a person's decision to reproduce.
It is unlikely, however, that any court would impose infringement
liability under these circumstances, since the Supreme Court has recog-
94. "Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses or
sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent." 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West 1984). See Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg.
Co. Inc., 620 F.2d 1166 (6th Cir. 1980); Cummins Engine Co. Inc. v. General Motors Corp.,
299 F. Supp. 59 (D. Md. 1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 1368 (4th Cir. 1970). The intent of the in-
fringer, however, is relevant to the measure of damages. Roller Bearing Co. of America v.
Bearings, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 475 F.2d 1399 (3rd Cir. 1971).
95. Graver Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
96. The "doctrine of equivalents" is founded on the theory that "if two devices do the
same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same result,...
even though they differ in name, form, or shape," a patentee may proceed against the producer
of the device to prevent infringement of her invention. Graver Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 339 U.S.
605, 608 (1950).
97. Couples producing the patented genotype as a result of a natural mutation, however,
would not be subject to an infringement suit. In addition, such an event would likely invali-
date the patent, as the invention would no longer be deemed to be statutory subject matter.
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty 447 U.S. 303 (only living matter that is non-naturally occurring
is patentable statutory subject matter).
98. Since patent protection only lasts seventeen years, persons born with patented DNA
material would, in most cases, not reproduce until after the patent had expired.
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nized a fundamental right of privacy in certain personal decisions.99 The
fundamental right of privacy has been found to encompass an individ-
ual's interest in making family planning decisions without government
intrusions."°° In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized procrea-
tion as "a basic liberty." 101 Governmental actions that abridge these
interests warrant a court's strict scrutiny" 2 and are unconstitutional ab-
sent an "extraordinary justification." 103
To the extent they infringed the procreation and privacy rights of
anyone entitled to constitutional protections, current patent laws would
be unconstitutional. In order to overcome a presumption of unconstitu-
tionality, the patent statute would have to be found to be narrowly tai-
lored to promote a compelling governmental interest."°
An amendment to current patent laws, however, would eliminate
the possibility of this issue arising. Analogous to an exemption under the
Plant Variety Protection Act 105 that allows farmers to cultivate crops
from seeds produced from "patented" plants, a congressional enactment
could exempt parents possessing manufactured genotypes from patent in-
fringement liability. Such an exemption would leave intact statutes pro-
tecting inventors against first generation infringement of their patents
without threatening the cherished fundamental rights of persons possess-
ing a patented genotype.
99. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (reproduction decisions); Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944) (family relationships).
100. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (contraception).
101. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 479, 541 (1965) (statute authorizing sterilization of
habitual criminals held unconstitutional on equal protection grounds); but see Buck v. Bell,
274 U.S. 200 (1927) (sterilization statute applicable to mentally incompetent persons in state
institutions upheld).
102. Strict scrutiny acknowledges that political choices burdening fundamental rights
"must be subjected to close analysis in order to preserve substantive values of equality and
liberty. Although strict scrutiny ... ordinarily appears as a standard for judicial review, it
may also be understood as admonishing lawmakers and regulators as well to be particularly
cautious of their own purposes and premises and of the effects of their choices." L. TRmNE,
AMERiCAN CONSrrUTIONAL LAW 1451 (2d ed. 1988).
103. Lupu, supra note 93, at 1029-30. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973))
("Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved,... regulation limiting these rights may be
justified only by a 'compelling state interest,' . . . and... legislative enactments must be
narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.").
104. Id. at 144. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
105. 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2321-2583 (West 1988) provides patent protection of new varieties of
seeds for a period of eighteen years. Under the statute, farmers are exempt from infringement
actions and from paying additional royalties for saving second generation seeds. Id at § 2543.
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2. Patents and Pivacy
The patent statute requires a written description of an invention. 106
Practicing a patent to create a novel and useful genotype and implanting
it in a person might infringe that person's right to privacy through the
patent's public disclosure of her genetic constitution. For a human in-
vention, the present statute appears to require public disclosure ,of the
genetic coding for a particular trait or traits regardless of whether per-
sons possessing the patented genotypes consent to such disclosure.
Although a given individual would not be identified by name in the pat-
ent description, she would be readily identifiable if the patented genotype
expressed a phenotype that was unique within the population. She would
thus have a privacy interest in maintaining the confidentiality of her ge-
netic constitution.
One element of privacy is the ability to retain and control the disclo-
sure of personal information."0 7 The Supreme Court has recognized a
right to regulate the disclosure of personal matters.10 8 In addition, the
confidentiality of various types of sensitive information is protected by a
myriad of federal and state laws governing the record-keeping activities
of public employers and agencies.c°9 The privacy right to prevent disclo-
sure of personal information may comprise a right to control others' use
of that information. 10 The PTO's disclosure without consent of intimate
personal information111 might significantly impinge on the right of
privacy.
106. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112 (West 1984).
107. See Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968).
108. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (striking down a law requiring doctors to
disclose names of patients who obtain certain drugs); but see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976) (police disclosure of shoplifting arrest did not violate suspect's right of privacy).
109. See Detroit Edison Company v. National Labor Relations Board, 440 U.S. 301 (1979)
(privacy interest as grounds for restricting disclosure without consent of employee's test scores
to union). The Detroit Edison court cited the following as examples of such legislation: Pri-
vacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552A (written consent required for disclosure of information in
individual records); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-204(3)(a) (1973) (regulating disclosure of med-
ical, psychological, and scholastic achievement data in public records); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 68A.7(10)-(11) (West 1973) (regulating disclosure of personal information in public em-
ployee records); N.Y. PUB. OFF. Law § 89(2)(b)(i)-(c)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1978) (disapprov-
ing release of employment and medical information in public records without consent).
110. See United States v. Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corp., 112 F.R.D. 325 (W.D.N.Y.
1986) (health information of Love Canal area residents obtained during state-conducted health
emergency studies was confidential and not subject to disclosure).
111. "[A] genetic profile is likely to be a permanent fixture of one's biological legacy."
Lappe, The Limits of Genetic Inquiry, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 7 (Aug. 1987). Genetic coun-
selors have discovered that many persons affected with genetic disorders perceive genetic infor-
mation as more personal and more revealing than medical history or credit history. Leonard,
Chase, and Childs, Genetic Counseling: A Consumer's View, 287 NEW ENG. 3. MED. 433
(1972).
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Judicial recognition of an interest in maintaining the confidentiality
of health records and hereditary information might also include protec-
tion of genetic data from disclosure without the consent of the individual
involved. 112 The Supreme Court, however, is unlikely to render patent-
ing of human beings unconstitutional on the basis of a violation of the
right of privacy by the patent statute's disclosure requirement. Such a
ruling would be an overreaction to the violation of a right that the Court
has recognized only implicitly. Yet incursions on privacy interests may
justify striking down the patent disclosure statute as unconstitutional.
Mandatory public disclosure of a person's genetic constitution in a patent
would seem to infringe a protected privacy interest in that person's con-
trol over another's use of personal information.
An exception to the patent statute could provide sufficient protec-
tion against the disclosure of intimate genetic information in patents. An
exception similar to that provided under the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA)113 might be formulated. Under the FOIA exemption, infor-
mation involving medical files, the disclosure of which would constitute
"a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," may be withheld
from disclosure.114 The exemption is intended to protect individuals
from a "wide range of embarrassing disclosures,"' 5 including informa-
tion relating to "marital status, legitimacy of children, identity of fathers
of children, [and] medical condition "1.... "6
Similarly, an exemption to the patent statute's disclosure require-
ment could provide for release of personal information relating to an in-
dividual's patented genotype only upon a request made to the PTO
commissioner. Disclosure of the information would be justified only
when the commissioner determines that the private concerns seeking the
information outweigh the patented gene recipient's interest in keeping
the information confidential.1 1 7 An exemption preventing indiscriminate
disclosure of an individual's genetic makeup would safeguard the confi-
dentiality of personal information, a fundamental right of privacy.
3. Summary
Although ownership of patent rights in genetically altered human
beings might be constitutional, the exercise of a patentee's rights could
112. Cf. U.S. v. Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corp., 112 F.R.D. 325 (W.D.N.Y. 1986).
113. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 1977). FOIA mandates a policy of broad disclosure by gov-
ernments when production is properly requested. When a request is made, an agency may
withhold a document, or portions thereof, only if the information falls within one of nine
statutory exemptions.114. Id § 552(b)(6).
115. Board of Trade v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 627 F.2d 392, 399 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 578 F. Supp. 704 (D.D.C. 1983).
116. 627 F.2d at 399.
117. Cf. Rural Housing Alliance v. USDA, 498 F.2d 73, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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infringe protected civil liberties. If "manufacture" of patented human
inventions resulted in only subtle restraints on the patented subject's in-
ternal autonomy, the inventor's practice of her invention would likely be
found constitutional. But if patent practice resulted in extreme forms of
subjugation, such as that involved in the creation of animal-human hy-
brids or sub-human life forms, the practice would likely be
unconstitutional.
For instance, although the patent statute gives a patentee the right
to exclude others from manufacturing her invention, strict enforcement
of that right could infringe the "manufactured" person's constitutionally
protected right to procreate. Narrow tailoring of the patent statute
would be necessary in order to preserve its constitutionality. This could
be achieved by amending the statute to exclude infringement claims
against patented human beings whose patented genotypes were repro-
duced in offspring.
The "manufacturing" of patented human genotypes would also
threaten the privacy interests of individuals who were recipients of the
genetic implants. Public disclosure of a person's genetic constitution in a
patent would compromise the patented individual's interest in maintain-
ing the confidentiality of personal information. An amendment to the
present patent disclosure statute, similar to an exemption provided under
the Freedom of Information Act, would protect this privacy interest.
HI. Unconstitutional Consequences of the Patent
Although the uses to which an inventor put his patent might raise
constitutional issues, still other problems are foreseeable. Allowing
products of human genetic engineering to be patented might foster con-
stitutional violations by persons other than the inventor.
A. Private Actions
Discrimination against those with manufactured genotypes would
be particularly acute if the patented genetic material expressed a unique,
observable phenotypq or trait. Alternatively, individuals without such ge-
netic implants might be discriminated against for not possessing certain
patented genotypes deemed to be superior. As such, the PTO's prohibi-
tion may be intended to prevent unconstitutional discrimination arising
from the dissemination of certain patented human genes.
The workplace is one area where discrimination based on genetic
factors - race and sex - has occurred in the past and will likely occur
again . 11 8 The language of Title VII suggests that the Act might be inter-
118. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employment
practices based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000, 2000e-
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preted to include discrimination on the basis of genetic makeup.119 If so,
an employer's refusal to hire a person because she possesses a patented
genotype would violate Title VII and might provide an avenue for re-
dressing injuries suffered as a result of the discrimination.
Conversely, a recipient of a patented genotype that provided certain
biological benefits might be given hiring preference over a person without
the patented genotype. Suppose that a phenotype provided superior
resistance to the toxicity of certain environmental agents. 2° Employers
might prefer to fill certain jobs with individuals who have this patented
genotype. Discrimination in favor of patented individuals may be justi-
fied by the employer's interest in employee safety.12 Nevertheless, pref-
erences create class distinctions between persons possessing patented and
non-patented genes.
B. State Actions
Similarly, discriminatory state actions may result from allowing
human inventions to be patented. The availability of surgical procedures
for implanting patented genes may inspire lawmakers to require the pro-
duction and dissemination of patented genotypes that yield certain de-
sired characteristics. Although a law requiring correction of genetic
defects in afflicted individuals would likely pass constitutional scru-
tiny, 122 legislation mandating the manufacture of individuals with certain
state-sponsored genetic coding would compromise constitutional guaran-
tees, including privacy rights to be free from governmental intrusion,
thirteenth amendment protections against subjugation, and the prohibi-
2 (West 1964). This prohibition applies to employers with twenty-five or more employees.
See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (sex discrimination).
119. Saint Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 107 S.Ct. 2002 (1987), held that racial discrimi-
nation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 includes "discrimination against an individual because he or
she is generally part of an ethnically and physiognomically distinctive sub-grouping of Homo
sapiens." Minimum requirements for height and weight, which are genetically determined
characteristics, have been found to hav6 a discriminatory impact. on women job applicants.
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
120. Some people have a deficiency in the enzyme glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase (G-
6-PD) caused by a variation in the form of a single gene. The deficiency is usually harmless,
but if affected individuals take certain medications for treatment of malaria, they may suffer
from acute anemia. People with G-6-PD deficiency may be at increased risk of disease in
workplaces where they are exposed to chemicals similar to the antimalaria drugs. U.S. CON-
GRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE ROLE OF GENETIC TESTING IN THE
PREVENTION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE (SUMMARY) 9 (1983).
121. A "bona fide occupational qualification" establishes an exception to Title VII's gen-
eral prohibition against discrimination. An employer who discriminates in hiring on the basis
of a characteristic must demonstrate a factual basis for believing that the excluded group of
persons would be unable to perform the duties of the job safely and efficiently. Weeks v.
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
122. See infra notes 136-140 and accompanying text.
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tion of creating a class of superior citizenry.
123
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause 24 prohibits
discriminatory state actions.1 25 Legislation that treats people differently
on the basis of a "suspect" classification must overcome a presumption
that it is unconstitutional.1 26 A classification is suspect if the distinction
is based on an immutable characteristic.1 27  Invidious discrimination
against a "discrete and insular minority" in need of "extraordinary pro-
tection from the majoritarian political process" warrants strict judicial
scrutiny of the legislation. 128 Disparate treatment may be justified if the
classification is necessary to further a compelling government interest.1
29
A "negative eugenics" statute, requiring replacement of defective
genes with a patented genotype to cure an inherited disease, would differ-
entiate between people who possess the genetic defect and those who do
not. Since inherited characteristics are immutable, classification on the
basis of genetic constitution could be characterized as "suspect," and
thus be subject to strict scrutiny, the standard for suspect classifications.
But, since negative eugenics policies seek not to impose a burden but to
eliminate the debilitating effects of genetic disorders, a state might be
able to show a compelling interest for such a classification.
Alternatively, a court might find a more lenient standard warranted.
A law having a discriminatory effect in mandating correction of genetic
defects might be subject to an intermediate standard of review, the same
as that for other laws that classify people on the basis of genetically-
infiuenced characteristics, namely gender. Such a standard would re-
quire that negative eugenics laws be "substantially related" to an "impor-
tant" governmental interest.1
30
Three state interests might be raised in an attempt to justify a statute
mandating correction of defective genetic material. 3 ' One would be the
123. See infra notes 141-149 and accompanying text.
124. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
125. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause has been interpreted to provide the same
protection against discrimination imposed by federal laws. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See eg.
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (public school segregation in District of Columbia held
violative of due process).
126. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
127. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633
(1948) (national origin); but see Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (illegitimacy held not
to constitute a suspect class).
128. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The Four-
teenth Amendment requires a very heavy burden of justification for state statutes drawn ac-
cording to race. Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1 (1967). See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & 3. N.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 531 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter NOWAK].
129. Id. at 580.
130. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
131. Kass, Making Babies-The New Biology and the Old Morality, 26 PUB. INT. 18, 39-45
(1972). See also Note, supra note 8, at 566.
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elimination of deleterious genes from the gene pool. l"2 Practiced on a
vast scale, prenatal genetic surgery could reduce the total number of
harmful genes in the population, 13 3 thereby decreasing the frequency
with which fatal diseases occur. A second state interest would be to re-
duce the financial burdens on society of caring for individuals afflicted
with genetic diseases.'13  Third would be the state's interest in prevent-
ing pain and suffering experienced by victims of such diseases.1
3 5
A negative eugenics law would serve these three state interests. The
Supreme Court has identified public health as "an important and legiti-
mate interest."' 136 A legislature can enact "reasonable regulations" to
protect public health and safety, including a compulsory vaccination pro-
gram to prevent the spread of communicable diseases. 137 Likewise, a
government's public health powers may be exercised in line with its inter-
est to protect future generations from the spread of disease through ge-
netic processes. 138  Correction of genetic defects in fetuses could help
132. "Three generations of imbeciles are enough." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927)
(sterilization of institutionalized mentally retarded woman who was "the daughter of a feeble
minded mother in the same institution, and the mother of an illegitimate feeble minded child,"
found not to violate due process).
133. SPLICING LIFE, supra note 31, at 46. But see Human Genetic Engineering Hearings,
supra note 2, at 187 (testimony of Professor Alexander Capron, Executive Director, Presi-
dent's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behav-
ioral Research): "[W]hat are regarded as genetic diseases today might be needed because of
some advantage they would give in other circumstances."
134. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. at 207: "It would be strange if [the state] could not call
upon those who already sap the strength of the state for these lesser sacrifices (sterilization),
often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with
incompetence."
135. Sterilization laws also implicate the interest in preventing pain and suffering. Buck v.
Bell, 274 U.S. at 207: "It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting... to let [offspring]
starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing
their kind." Compare Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 545 (1941) (Stone, CJ., concur-
ring) ("the state may protect itself from... inheritable tendencies of the individual which are
injurious to society"), with Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 726, 198 P.2d 17, 26 (1948) ("the
state 'may properly protect itself as well as the children by taking steps which will prevent the
birth of offspring....' ").
136. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
137. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1985) (small pox).
138. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. at 207; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
Governmental imposition of mandatory medical treatment runs counter to the privacy rights
of individuals who refuse such treatment. But when the safety of innocent third persons is at
stake, the state's interest is compelling and individual privacy interests are sacrificed. Compare
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ. 1976) (right of privacy extended to termination of life-
sustaining medical care) and Rogers v. Okin, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983) (privacy
right of non-institutionalized mental patients to refuse anti-psychotic drugs) with Jefferson v.
Griffen Spalding Co. Hospital, 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981) (court order upheld author-
izing physicians to perform cesarean section and give patient blood transfusions against her
will). It seems that those who consent to sterilization, however, may be entitled to refuse
treatment for their genetic disorders.
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save pregnancies and alleviate the substantial burdens of care on society
that the birth of a genetically defective child might impose.' 39  As an
additional safeguard, mandatory prenatal genetic surgery could be lim-
ited to circumstances where the likelihood of a particular disease and the
potential for pain and suffering are great."4 So limited, the purposes
served by a negative eugenics statute might be deemed compelling. At a
minimum, such a law would likely pass muster under an intermediate
standard of review.
On the other hand, a positive eugenics law expressing state prefer-
ences for certain traits would be more vulnerable to constitutional attack.
According to one commentator, "improvement of the genetic makeup of
the community differs greatly in degree, if not in kind, from the...
interest in preventing extreme suffering that justifies negative eugen-
ics."'' A positive eugenics law would impermissibly burden those who
do not possess the characteristic endorsed by the government. 142 Such a
law would also interfere with the fundamental right to be free from gov-
ernment intrusions in one's personal life.' 43 Under strict scrutiny, the
state would have the burden of showing the eugenics statute was "neces-
sary to promote a compelling governmental interest."'" Improving the
vigor of the gene pool might be a desirable goal, but such a purpose
would represent a state interest that is speculative rather than compel-
ling. The benefits to be derived from a positive eugenics law are not
likely to overcome the severe burden that discrimination and intrusion
on personal privacy would impose on the state's citizenry.
Another problem with a law promoting positive eugenics is the po-
tential for creating a generation with superior traits. It has been asserted
that such a result might be equivalent to the creation of a superior noble
class, 45 which would be prohibited under the Constitution's Nobility
Clause.'" The Supreme Court has expressed repugnance toward the de-
139. Note, Eugenic Sterilization-A Scientific Analysis, 46 DENv. L.J. 631, 650 (1969).
140. Cf SPLICING LiEr, supra note 31, at 66 (involuntary blood transfusions of pregnant
women have been ordered by courts when physicians conclude it is necessary to prevent seri-
ous harm to fetuses).
141. Note, supra note 8, at 579; see Gustafson, Genetic Counselling and the Uses of Genetic
Knowledge-An Ethical Overview, ETHICAL IssuEs IN HUMAN GENETICS 101 (1973).
142. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 609 F. Supp. 1491, 1498 (D. Colo. 1985) ("Mhe
Constitution requires... that the government must not itself act as an agent of predestination
in association with any immutable characteristic of birth.")
143. See NowAK, supra note 128, at 685. Cf Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(statute prohibiting grade schools from teaching in language other than English struck down);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268'U.S. 510 (1925) (statute requiring students to attend public
school instead of private school held to violate due process).
144. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
145. See Note, supra note 8, at 579-82.
146. "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States .... ." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 8. "No State shall ... grant any Title of Nobility." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. At
least one court has observed, "The rationale behind prohibition against any title of nobility ...
velopment of a superior class of people. 14 7 State action promoting cer-
tain genetic traits would infringe thirteenth amendment protections. A
state's preference for some genotypes would necessarily make other ge-
notypes officially undesirable; those with undesirable genotypes would be
subjugated to those with government-sponsored genotypes. Thus, unpat-
ented genotypes would represent a badge of slavery.148 Notwithstanding
the unconstitutionality of such a law, the ominous tone of Professor
Stich's remarks regarding human genetic engineering during his testi-
mony before Congress would make any legislator think twice before en-
acting a positive eugenics statute: "[T]hose who are unwilling or unable
to take advantage of the new technology may find that their offspring
have been condemned to a sort of second class citizenship in a world
where what had been within the range of the normal gradually slips into
the domain of the subnormal."' 149
C. Summary
The consequences of allowing human beings to be patented may in-
clude unconstitutional state and private actions. The ability to produce
humans according to specification, and the commercial availability of
such patented products, contemplates the development of preferences for
individuals possessing certain genetic characteristics. Such preferences
may be expressed by private parties in the form of discriminatory em-
ployment practices. Alternatively, enactment of eugenics legislation
would demonstrate state preference for certain genotypes over others.
Many such actions would be unconstitutional.
IV. Constitutionality as a Condition Precedent to Patentability
Patent law is at a crossroads. Constitutional authorization for pat-
ent rights in human inventions intersects with constitutional protection
of civil liberties. The PTO's unexplained contention that patents on
human beings are unconstitutional may be based on the unconstitutional-
ity of foreseeable patent practices or of anticipated private and state ac-
tions arising from implants of patented genes. If so, the PTO has
equally would permit the United States from attaching any badge of ignobility to a citizen at
birth." Eskra v. Morton, 524 F.2d 9, 13 n.8 (7th Cir. 1975).
147. The Court in Meyer v. Nebraska stated, "[T]he state may do much, go very far, in-
deed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally, [and] morally,. . . but
the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected." 262 U.S. 390, 401-02
(1923) (striking down a statute prohibiting teaching of foreign languages to school children on
due process grounds).
148. Cf Note, supra note 8, at 581 (arguing that to deny one the opportunity to clone
oneself may constitute a "badge of slavery" where genotypic inferiority would deny a right to
reproduce while an elite group is granted the right to clonal reproduction).
149. Human Genetic Engineering Hearings, supra note 2, at 537 (testimony of Stephen
Stich, professor of philosophy, University of Maryland).
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constructively imposed a new requirement for protecting inventions
under United States patent laws: all uses of an invention must be
constitutional.
Article I of the Constitution gives Congress broad power to legislate
"[t]o promote the Progress of... useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to... Inventors the exclusive Right to their Discoveries." 150 The
Patent Act of 1952' 5 ' is Congress' most recent enactment pursuant to
this grant of authority.
In contrast, the PTO has only statutory authority to apply the legis-
lative scheme enacted by Congress.152 The PTO is neither empowered
nor competent to make constitutional determinations. To the extent the
PTO rules on a patent's constitutionality, it oversteps its authority and
frustrates the constitutional standard set forth in Article I.
A. Legislative History of United States Patent Laws
The Patent Act of 1793, authored by Thomas Jefferson, "embodied
Jefferson's philosophy that 'ingenuity should receive a liberal encourage-
ment.' "I"5 In Diamond v. Chakrabarty54 the court declared patentable
subject matter to "include anything under the sun that is made by
man.' 5 5 The legislative history of patent laws supports the Court's in-
terpretation.1 56 Congress employed broad general language in drafting
35 U.S.C. § 101 precisely because inventions are often unforeseeable.15 7
To effectuate its constitutional directive, Congress contemplated that pat-
ent laws should be given broad interpretation.
58
150. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980).
151. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-272 (West 1984).
152. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
153. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S at 308-9 (citing WRmNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON at 75-76
(Washington ed. 1871)); see Graham, 383 U.S. at 7-10.
154. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). Chakrabarty's patent contained a claim to a human-made, ge-
netically engineered bacterium capable of breaking down multiple components of crude oil.
lt at 305. Chakrabarty's invention met the statutory requirements of novelty, utility and non-
obviousness, but was rejected by the PTO and the patent office board of appeals on the basis
that living things are not patentable subject matter. Id. at 306. The Supreme Court, constru-
ing the patent statute broadly, concluded that 35 U.S.C. § 101 includes living things. Id. at
314.
155. Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No.
1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952)).
156. See S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess., 6 (1952); see also Patent Law Codification and Revision Hearings on H. 3760
before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 37
(1951) (testimony of P. J. Federico).
157. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 316 n.10 (listing unforeseen patented inventions: telegraph,
telephone, electric lamp, airplane, transistor, atomic reactor, laser).
158. Id. at 308.
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B. Patentability of Inventions Used for Illegal Purposes15 9
A patent in an invention grants the inventor exclusive rights in her
invention for a limited time, subject to state and federal law."6 Prohib-
iting the use of a patented article goes to the use of the article, not to the
grant of the patent. 161 A patent is not invalid because it may be possible
to put the article to use for an illegal purpose. If a device may be legally
employed and is "normally and naturally adaptive to a lawful use, the
patent... will not be held invalid as against public policy.
162
Congress' grant of constitutional authority to enact patent laws,
however, is limited to "the promotion of the 'useful arts.' "163 Although
contemplated illegal or immoral uses of an invention do not render the
invention unpatentable, an article may not meet the statutory usefulness
requirement if the only use to which an invention can be put is an illegal
one. 16 But if an invention can be put to any lawful purpose, the useful-
ness requirement will be met and the article will be patentable. The same
conclusion should obtain if an invention has uses that are constitutional:
the usefulness requirement will be satisfied and the invention will be
patentable.
A person who commits an illegal act with a patented invention is
subject to legal sanctions. Similarly, a person who suffers a constitutional
injury as a result of a patented invention's use has a claim against those
who inflicted the harm. If the injury results from practice of the patent,
the plaintiff may seek relief from the inventor or her licensees. If an
inventor's practice of a patent resulted in subjugation and violated the
Thirteenth Amendment, she would be subject to prosecution under fed-
eral peonage statutes.
165
If the injury results from actions of third parties such as a private
individual or the government, the plaintiff may seek relief from that third
party. Thus an employer who hired an employee solely on the basis of a
phenotype expressed by a patented genotype might be liable, under Title
159. Illegality and unconstitutionality do not completely overlap. Analysis of the effect of
an invention's illegal applications, however, is useful by analogy in determining patentability of
human inventions whose potential uses would violate a provision of the Constitution.
160. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852); United Shoe Machinery v. United
States, 258 U.S. 451, 463 (1921); and see Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501, 503 (1878).
161. Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274, 279 (7th Cir. 1903).
162. Koppe v. Burnstingle, 29 F.2d 923, 925 (D. R.I. 1929).
163. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
164. The cases involve patented inventions used as gambling devices in contravention of
local law. See Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274 (7th Cir. 1903); Koppe v. Burnstingle, 29 F.2d 923,
925 (D.R.I. 1929); and see 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1984).
165. 18 U.S.C. § 1581 provides that one who is found guilty of holding a person in peonage
shall be fined a maximum of $5000 and is subject to up to five years imprisonment. 18
U.S.C.A. § 1581 (West 1984). A patentee of a human invention might also come under the
provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1584, and would be subject to the same penalties if the patented
genes expressed phenotypes subjugating those persons into whom the genotype was implanted.
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VII, to those wiihout the genotype who weren't hired. Or a plaintiff
might seek to enjoin the practice of inserting certain patented genotypes
in fetuses pursuant to a state's positive eugenics statute.
Remedies exist at law for unconstitutional uses of patented inven-
tions, just as remedies exist for an invention's illegal uses. Legal remedies
provide a sufficient disincentive for employing a patented invention to
unconstitutional ends. In addition, the usefulness requirement presefits
an impediment to patenting inventions whose uses have exclusively un-
constitutional effects.
Human inventions will have useful and lawful applications. Selec-
tion of physical or mental characteristics by parents for their offspring
may be advantageous for survival and success. For example, parents
might choose a patented genotype for their child that would produce a
phenotype providing greater immunity to infection and disease. Yet the
potential for unconstitutional uses of a human invention remains. Com-
mercial availability of a useful human genotype may induce a govern-
ment authority to require that all fetuses receive implants of the patented
gene. Thus a human invention's usefulness might come at the expense of
potential unconstitutional consequences. Determining the patentability
of human inventions might best be accomplished by balancing the utility
of the invention against illegal or unconstitutional effects that are likely
to develop. Since the PTO lacks the competence to assess the signifi-
cance of the constitutional impact human inventions might have, a bal-
ancing of utility and effects should be made by courts or by Congress.'6 6
Not only does the PTO lack competence to make such constitutional
determinations, but it also lacks the authority to impose new require-
ments for the patentability of human inventions.
C. The PTO's Authority to Bar Patents on Human Inventions
The Patent and Trademark Office is vested with the duty to grant
and issue patents.'67 This duty is limited to examining patent applica-
tions "to determine if they meet requirements of law for the issuance of
patents .... "16  In addition, the Commissioner of the PTO may estab-
lish regulations for PTO proceedings,' 69 and may perform fuinctions that
are "necessary and proper" in the exercise of the authority delegated to
his office.170 The Commissioner's responsibilities also include establish-
ing policies and regulations pertaining to the administration of patent
laws; the Commissioner plays a "key role in intellectual property issues
166. See infra notes 183-196 and accompanying text.
167. 35 U.S.C.A. § 6 (West 1984).
168. 48 Fed. Reg. 14,735 (1983).
169. Id.
170. Id.
confronting the nation."17 1  This'role, however, neither encompasses
making laws that define the scope of patent protection to which broad
categories of inventions are entitled nor determines issues of constitu-
tional law arising from the use of patented inventions. Only Congress
has the power to enact laws pertaining to patents,7 2 and only the courts
may determine the constitutionality of actions conducted under these
laws. 173
All of the conditions of patentability are set out in the 1952 Patent
Act.'7 4 In its policy to deny patents on human inventions, the PTO ap-
pears to be imposing an additional requirement of "constitutional use"
on the patentability of inventions. 175  But nowhere within Title 35 is
there a requirement that all the uses of an invention must be constitu-
tional.' 76 A human invention that meets the statutory requirements of
novelty, nonobviousness and utility is patentable. 77 To the extent that
the PTO rejects patent applications on the basis that the inventions will
produce a constitutional injury, the PTO fails to fulfill its duties.
Even if the PTO had the authority to enact a rule that inventions
must not have unconstitutional uses, the PTO is not competent to assess
the constitutionality of a human invention's uses. Nor is the PTO com-
petent to resolve the difficult moral and ethical problems that invention
of artificially engineered human genotypes will pose. 17  Therefore, the
PTO's prohibition on patenting of human inventions on the grounds of
171. Id.
172. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, para. 8.
173. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch. 137 (1803).
174. Where Congress is silent, the Supreme Court has found implied limitations and condi-
tions. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933): "In choosing
such expansive terms as 'manufacture' and 'composition of matter,' modified by the compre-
hensive 'any,' Congress... contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope."
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
175. In Graham v. John Deere Co. the Court articulated the function of the PTO, which
did not include formulating new conditions of patentability: "It is the duty of the Commis-
sioner of Patents and of the courts in the administration of the patent system to give effect to
the constitutional standard by appropriate application, in each case, of the statutory scheme of
the Congress." 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
176. At least one court has determined that "[u]nder 35 U.S.C § 102 an applicant is 'enti-
tled to a patent unless' it is shown that one or another of the prohibitory provisions therein...
applies." In re Stempel, 241 F.2d 755, 759-60 (C.C.P.A. 1957).
177. Living biological material that is the product of human genetic intervention is patent-
able subject matter. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303. Whether the living matter is of human origin
is irrelevant.
178. If the Supreme Court is not competent to resolve such issues, then the PTO is not
either. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in Chakrabarty, referred to the "gruesome
parade of horribles" of pollution, disease, the risk of loss of genetic diversity, and the potential
for depreciating the value of human life posed by genetic research and technological develop-
ment, and concluded that the Court is "without competence to entertain these arguments-
either to brush them aside.., or to act on them." 447 U.S. at 316-17. Politically sensitive
issues such as these are traditionally left to the legislature to resolve.
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unconstitutionality not only ignores the meaning of the patent laws it
administers, but also disregards limits on its power as an administrative
agency.
D. Summary
In order to be patentable, an invention must meet the statutory re-
quirements enacted by Congress. One of these requirements is useful-
ness. Although an invention that can be used only for illegal purposes
will not meet the usefulness requirement, an invention is patentable if it
can be put to any lawful purpose.. Certain practices of a patent on a
human invention and certain private and state actions arising from al-
lowing human inventions to be patented pose constitutional problems.
The potential frequency and severity of such unconstitutional effects of
the patent may reduce the invention's utility, which may render the in-
vention unpatentable.
Certain human inventions capable of being employed in a manner
having unconstitutional effects, however, would not meet the usefulness
threshold for patents. New human life forms that meet the statutory
requirements, including usefulness, are patentable. But because the PTO
lacks competence to make determinations of constitutional law, the PTO
is unable to assess whether human inventions meet the usefulness stan-
dard. On the other hand, if the PTO's policy to prohibit patents on
human inventions imposes an additional requirement on patentability,
the PTO has exceeded its powers as an administrative agency.
V. Regulation
The issues involved in deciding how life can or should be altered and
the uses to which genetically altered products can be put are "well be-
yond the competence or authority of the Patent Office."179 In its prohibi-
tion of patents on human inventions, the PTO was probably attempting
to forestall problems that would ultimately arise. Although granting pat-
ent rights in human genotypes does not in itself violate provisions of the
Constitution, the potential for abuse of human inventions are matters of
public concern.180 To ensure that fundamental constitutional rights con-
tinue to be protected while encouraging the development of patentable
179. Id. at 22; see Patent Hearings, supra note 15 at 182 (testimony of Professor Robert P.
Merges, Columbia Law School): "The patent system is not normally the proper place to con-
duct technology assessment." See also H.R. 1827, amend. no. 245, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(proposal to bar the PTO from expending funds during fiscal year 1987 for purpose of granting
patents on genetically altered animals); 133 CONG. REc. S7268 (daily ed. May 28, 1987)
("[S]uch a monumental decision about the fate of animal life should not be left only to the U.S.
Patent Office.") (statement of Sen. Hatfield). The amendment was ultimately deleted from the
Senate appropriations bill.
180. A National Science Foundation survey indicates that almost two-thirds of the public
believe studies in creating new life forms should not be pursued. Walsh, Public Attitude To-
inventions, regulations should forbid unconstitutional practices in the
use, manufacture, and sale of human products of genetic engineering. To
be fully effective, such regulation must also provide for oversight to pre-
vent the development of unconstitutional state and private actions that
might arise out of the commercial availability of patented human
inventions.
In 1982 Professor Alexander Capron, Executive Director of the
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, testified before a House Sub-
committee on the ethical and social issues raised by genetic engineering.
He stated that "no legal or regulatory prohibition" exists on "creating an
actual being with partially human characteristics."'81 Other commenta-
tors have also expressed concern over how the creation of new life forms
will be controlled; one of them averred that "[t]he PTO is the only public
agency currently discussing issues of what novel life forms may be cre-
ated and manufactured."'8 2 Certainly there is room for wider participa-
tion in this important area of policy-making.
Outside of the PTO, regulation of patented human genetic engineer-
ing technology and its products might occur at three different levels: judi-
cial assessment of the constitutionality of various uses of patented
products; legislative control over patented human inventions and their
uses; and administrative regulation of the manufacture of patented
human genetic material.
A. Judicial Review of the Use of Patented Human Genotypes
While review of acts of Congress is clearly a judicial function,8 3 the
Supreme Court is unlikely to rule that patents on human beings are per
se unconstitutional. 84 In light of the irreversibility and the potentially
ubiquitous impact of genetic engineering, "courts lack the sophisticated
research tools for solving the relatively novel problems posed and thus
should give great weight to legislative evaluations.... ."I85 The Supreme
Court has expressly stated that it is not competent to entertain argu-
ward Science is Yes, but-, SCIENCE, Jan. 15, 1982, at 270 (quoting National Science Board
annual report, Science Indicators 1980); see SPLICING LIFE, supra note,31, at 71.
181. Human Genetic Engineering Hearings, supra note 2, at 155.
182. Annas, At Law: Of Monkeys, Man, and Oysters, HASTiNGS CENTER REP. 20, 22
(Aug. 1987).
183. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
184. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. Absent a strong countervailing consti-
tutional argument, one commentator suggests that Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303
(1980), indicates the Supreme Court would hold that human inventions are patentable. Wes-
terhoff and Morrison, Patent Applications Will Be Entertained for New Organisms, LEGAL
TIMES, June 15, 1987, at 17, col. 3. Since Chakabarty, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stew-
art from the majority and Justice Powell, who joined in the dissent, have retired from the
Court.
185. Note, supra note 8, at 531.
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ments regarding the social policy issues surrounding the hazards of re-
combinant DNA research. 18 6 Some state courts have also concluded that
they are ill-equipped to grapple with the moral and ethical issues inher-
ent in genetic engineering.18
B. Legislative Action
Congress is a more appropriate body than the courts for determin-
ing whether human inventions should be allowed to be patented. 8 8
Although the courts have given a very broad interpretation to patent
laws, Congress is empowered to make patent protection unavailable to an
entire class of otherwise patentable subject matter.189 Based on its assess-
ment of moral and ethical concerns, Congress may therefore prohibit the
patenting of all inventions involving human beings who possess geneti-
cally engineered characteristics. 190 Even if such patents are permitted,
state or federal laws may restrict a patent holder's right to manufacture,
use and sell his invention.1 91
A flat prohibition on patenting new human genetic material is a
drastic measure, and is unnecessary to regulate effectively the use of such
products. Instead, Congress could prevent most abuses by prohibiting
the manufacture of animal-human hybrids and sub-humans and by pro-
viding how patented human inventions may be sold. Another set of laws
could create a remedy for parties with patented genotypes who have suf-
fered injuries, such as discrimination, as a result of their genetic status.
Unless amended, the Patent Act cannot be used to regulate how a
patent is practiced, but Congress may invoke powers granted under the
Commerce and Spending Clauses to restrict the manufacture, use, and
186. See supra note 178.
187. E.g., Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 hi. App. 2d 240, 259-63, 190 N.E.2d 849, 858-59, (1963)
cert. denied 379 U.S. 945 (1964) (creation of legal action for wrongful life against genetic
engineers is decision for state legislature).
1 188. "Congress is free to amend § 101 so as to exclude from patent protection organisms
produced by genetic engineering." Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 316-318.
189. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and subsequent legislation prohibit the granting of
patents for inventions involving atomic weapons. 42 U.S.C. § 2181 (a) reads, "No patent shall
... be granted for any invention or discovery which is useful solely in the utilization of special
nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2181(a) (West 1973).
190. Some members of Congress have introduced legislation to halt the patenting of new
life forms. A proposal to amend the Patent Act would have prohibited the patenting of geneti-
cally modified animals for two years. H.R. 3119, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 134 CONG. REc.
H7206 (daily ed. August 5, 1988), see H.R. REP. No. 888, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
Although H.R. 3119 was not enacted, H.R. 1556 was recently introduced to amend Title 35 of
the United States Code to provide that human beings are not patentable subject matter. H.R.
1556, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). At the time of publication of this Note, enactment of H.R.
1556 was pending.
191. Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501 (1878) (state statute prohibiting sale of patented
burning oil upheld; Decker v. FTC, 176 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir.) cert denied, 338 U.S. 878 (1949)
(fraudulent claims concerning function of patented article held to be violation of federal law).
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sale of patented human inventions. Wherever distribution of patented
human products is of an interstate character, Congress is empowered to
control the manufacture of patented products. 192 Congress could act
under the Commerce Clause to prohibit employment discrimination by
private parties on the basis of patented genetic makeup. 193 Moreover,
state statutes (such as eugenics laws) that conflicted with federal com-
merce regulations would be preempted. 194
Congress could also use its spending power to discourage research
activities of uncertain value. 195 The federal government is a significant
contributor of funding for genetic engineering research.' 96 By cutting off
funding for research into certain types of human inventions, Congress
could discourage their development without prohibiting the patenting of
all human inventions. State legislatures could act to prohibit patented
products of human genetic engineering technology. In light of the dan-
ger of diminishing genetic variety presented by the proliferation of "de-
sirable" or "superior" human inventions, a state's interest in banning the
local use of genetic engineering technology might be found compel-
ling.' 97 Additional important governmental interests including ensuring
personal autonomy, protection of personal privacy, elimination of dele-
terious genes from the gene pool, preventing pain and suffering, and re-
ducing the numbers of people with genetic disorders who must depend
on state-funded services might support state regulation of the uses of ge-
netic engineering in humans. 98
State and local governments, concerned over the consequences of
commercial genetic engineering, have already acted to control biotech-
nology research activities within their jurisdictions. 199 Municipal ordi-
192. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Com-
merce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.") Cf
Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding congressional act prohibiting transport of
illegal lottery tickets within channels of interstate commerce).
193. Cf. Katzenbach v. McClung, 375 U.S. 294 (1964) (Congress empowered to regulate
discriminatory practices of restaurant serving interstate travelers due to effect on interstate
commerce).
194. Cf Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (preemption of state alien registration
law that stood "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and
objectives of Congress").
195. "The Congress shall have Power To... provide for the... general Welfare of the
United States.. ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
196. In fiscal year 1983, the federal government spent $511 million on basic biotechnology
research. U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMMERCIAL BIOTECH-
NOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS (SUMMARY) 19 (1984).
197. Cf. Note, supra note 8, at 561.
198. See id. at 498.
199. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3220-3222 (McKinney 1985); CAMBRIDGE, MASS.
CODE art. III; § 11-7 et. seq. (1977); BERKELEY, CAL. ORDINANCES no. 5010-N.S. (1977);
BOROUGH OF PRINCETON, N.J. CODE ch. 26A, § 1 (1978); AMHERST, MASS. BY-LAws art.
III, § 10 (1978); WALTHAM, MASS. GENERAL ORDINANCES ch. 22 (1981). One township has
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nances restricting gene splicing research have been enacted in
communities where biological research and commercial biotechnology
enterprises are now propagating. These laws fill a regulatory gap created
by the limited applicability of federal guidelines. In these localities, insti-
tutions engaging in such research must obtain a permit from the city and
are subject to inspection by city officials to ensure their compliance with
federal and local law.
Regulations such as those contained in the local ordinances can be
an effective check on human genetic research. Such regulation in order
to prevent constitutional violations would minimize the need to prohibit
patenting an entire class of otherwise patentable inventions.
C. Administrative Regulation
The National Institute of Health's guidelines for research involving
recombinant DNA molecules are currently the only regulations gov-
erning laboratory studies involving transgenic animals produced through
genetic engineering.2"° A second generation of the Recombinant DNA
Advisory Committee" 1 currently oversees implementation of the NIH
guidelines.2 "2 New agencies, however, that are specifically suited to the
peculiar problems commercialization of patented human inventions is
likely to bring will be needed to establish guidelines for the manufacture,
use, and sale of patented human genotypes. In addition, new agencies
may be needed to enforce trade practices and standards of quality of pat-
ented products for industry and commerce.
Cognizant of the rapid pace of technological progress, legislatures
and administrative agencies are contemplating how future products of
biotechnology will be regulated.20 3 A panel composed of scientists, in-
dustry representatives, and religious leaders might be effective in provid-
ing guidelines for commercial development of genetic engineering and in
assessing the impact of new patented human inventions. Whatever
mechanism is employed to regulate the development of human inven-
prohibited the use within its borders of humans as experimental subjects in recombinant DNA
research. See id. § 22-2.
200. Compliance with these guidelines is mandatory for any scientist or institution receiv-
ing federal funding for research. See Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA
Molecules, 51 Fed. Reg. 16,958 et. seq. (May 7, 1986). Industry has voluntarily followed these
guidelines, with no reported violations since their adoption in 1976. Patent Hearings, supra
note 15, at 434 (testimony of Geoffrey M. Karny).
201. One-third of the committee's twenty-five members must specialize in molecular biol-
ogy or a related field; at least six must be scientists in other related disciplines, and at least six
must be authorities on public health, law, the environment, or public policy. U.S. CONGRESS,
OMCE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, IMPACTS ON APPLIED GENETICS---MICRO-ORA-
NISMs, PLANTS, AND ANIMALS 213 (1981).
202. SPLICING LIFE, supra note 31, at 12.
203. See id., at 87 (recommending creation of Genetic Engineering Commission to deal
exclusively with biotechnology issues).
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tions should encourage their patenting.204 Disclosures made in patent ap-
plications provide government the ability to foresee technological
developments and to determine what areas will require regulation. 0 5
Most importantly, patent laws provide inventors of biological inventions
the protection necessary to prevent misappropriation of their work and
to encourage continued research.
VI. Conclusion
While the patenting of human inventions may raise serious ethical
questions, the granting of such patent rights would not violate the Con-
stitution. A patent-an intangible property interest-grants its holder
only the exclusive right to her discovery. An inventor of a new human
life form does not have rights in any genotype other than the product of
her genetic manipulation. Nor does the scientist have a possessory inter-
est in the patented product, the resulting physical characteristic. Conse-
quently, the rights granted under a patent would not result in illegal
subjugation of the individual possessing the genotype. A patent on
human genetic material would thus not constitute a badge of slavery.
Certain exercises of these patent rights by the inventor, however,
would violate fundamental constitutional rights. Practices of a patent
that greatly restricted the external autonomy of one who possessed the
patented genotype, as would the creation of animal-human hybrids or
sub-humans, would be tantamount to imposing badges of slavery on peo-
ple, a practice prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. Mild restraints
on an individual's internal autonomy, however, such as disclosure of the
engineered genotype in a patent or implantation of a patented gene to
correct a disorder, would likely be constitutional. Thus, the degree of
restriction and autonomy that practice of a patented human invention
would have seems a useful measure of its permissibility.
In addition, patent protection of human inventions would impinge
on the fundamental right to procreate and on privacy interests in main-
taining confidentiality in the genetic constitutions of those possessing the
patented gene. As such, amendment of the patent statute might be neces-
sary to preserve the constitutionality of provisions giving inventors of
204. Denying patents on engineered genotypes would cause inventors to seek other forms
of intellectual property protection. See, eg., Kayton, Copyright in Living Genetically Engi-
neered Works, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 194 (1982) (protection of products of genetic engineer-
ing under copyright law). Because activities cloaked in the secrecy necessary for trade secret
production are more difficult to oversee, patents serve a public interest in disclosing research
activities being conducted.
205. See Note, Patents-A Live, Man-Made Micro-Organism is Patentable Subject Matter
Under 35 U.S.C § 101, 30 DRAKE L. Rv. 635, 647-49 (1980-81) (promoting use of the pat-
ent system assures public disclosure of research, which should not only serve to educate the
public and allay fears of genetic engineering, but also allow the public and Congress to identify
those areas where prohibitions may be advisable).
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human inventions a remedy for patent infringement. An exemption from
liability would protect the privacy rights of recipients of patented genetic
material. Another amendment restricting public access to information
contained in the patent regarding a person's genetic constitution would
safeguard against intrusions on privacy.
Furthermore, the availability of patented human inventions in the
marketplace may give rise to preferences for individuals having certain
genetic constitutions. This preference may be reflected in unconstitu-
tional state actions requiring correction of genetic disorders and in poli-
cies promoting the propagation of certain state-sponsored genotypes.
This preference might also take the form of unconstitutional discrimina-
tory private employment practices.
Unconstitutional practices of such patents and the development of
unconstitutional actions may diminish a human invention's utility, but
these potential consequences do not render inventions involving human
beings unpatentable. Therefore, the PTO's policy of prohibiting the pat-
enting of human beings is unfounded. Moreover, the PTO is not compe-
tent to perform the constitutional balancing necessary to assess a human
invention's patentability. Imposition of a requirement that all an inven-
tion's uses be constitutional is beyond the PTO's statutory authority.
Congress could prevent the adverse consequences of patenting
human inventions without prohibiting them altogether by regulating
their manufacture, use, and sale. 'In addition, myriad administrative
agencies will continue to oversee genetic engineering research. With the
exception of a statute prohibiting patents on nuclear weapons, the U.S.
patent system is devoid of safety, ethical, or economic judgments. Patent
laws should remain morally and ethically neutral and continue to "pro-
mote the progress of science and useful arts."
In the words of Professor Bernard Davis, "We can serve society best
not by blocking any particular knowledge'-but by better controlling its
applications . . . . [I]n the application of molecular genetics to man,
where enormously beneficial results are appearing, I do not yet see any
threats from which society needs protection.,
20 6
The PTO's contention that patenting genetically engineered human
beings is unconstitutional is devoid of constitutional analysis and is
wrong. Claims of inventions including a human being are patentable,
and such patents are constitutional. Superficial treatment of inventions
holding great promise for curing thousands of human genetic disorders
inhibits promotion of the useful arts. While the PTO's policy attempts to
prevent the problems that patenting human beings may bring, its effect
will be to hinder important biomedical research. The PTO's policy could
discourage significant medical advancements in related technologies and
206. Human Genetic Engineering Hearings, supra note 2, at 469 (statement of Bernard D.
Davis, Professor of Bacterial Physiology, Harvard University Medical School).
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could perpetuate public fear of technology and mistrust of science.
Human genetic engineering holds great promise, and any regulation of its
use should also encourage its continued development.
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